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Fuller and Language
Joseph Vining

1. Introduction
His style made Jlim distinctive. His substance made him distinctive. The
two crossed, were genetically related as we now say. Style and substance
each drew on and was implied by the other. One point of their crossing
was his sense of the nature of human language; what language was and
could be, what it was not and could never be.
In 1930, early in his work, Fuller took up the problem of Language in a
series of articles. Toward the end of his time he republished this initial
ground-establishing effort as the little book we now have, Legal Fictions, 1
and wrote a new introduction to it. His concern with language as such,
and with what a lawyer might be able to say to a linguist or a scientist
about it, thus brackets his work. I propose to return to Legal Fictions,
treating as something of a supplement to it The Law in Quest of Itself,2
which he also reissued in the mid-1960s and in which he pursued the
problem of language into the jurisprudential arguments of the day. The
rediscovery of the linguistic part of Fuller's contribution and of Fuller's
challenge to look at language and see what it tells - if rediscovery it be
rather than acknowledgment of influence - bears on current issues in law
and beyond law, the importance of which lies not surprisingly in their
connection to Fuller's substantive concerns.
Legal Fictions and The Law in Quest of Itself were written as the
totalitarian experiments of the twentieth century were gathering force.
The reissue of Fictions and Quest was some thirty years later, and we are
now some thirty years from their reissue. What becomes more apparent
with the passage of time is how different Fuller was in the seriousness
with which he took the atrocities of our era. There was a warmth about

1

2

Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967;
hereafter referred to as LF).
Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, [1940J 1966;
hereafter referred to as LQJ).
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him that stands in increasing contrast to the coolness of his contemporaries, for whom such engagement - though they themselves might slip into
it also - was fundamentally out of place in any objective legal science.
The contrast may become more apparent still in the years to come, as
there develops in Europe and in the United States, in Germany and in
Russia, a capacity and willingness to face the Holocaust and the Gulag as
revelatory events. There may be felt even something close to a necessity to
do so, in order to move on. I think here especially of George Steiner's
prophetic In Bluebeard's Castle. 3 This is of course more the province of
discussion today of Fuller's late work, The Morality of Law4 and the
Fuller-Hart debate, for which he is best known. But Fuller's warmth was
there before, at the time of the revelatory events themselves. Others were
pushing toward social science and "realism," toward psychiatry in its
explanatory forms, or toward systems that in fundamental character
would merge human affairs with a view of the world as a system of forces,
a process, and, ultimately, no more than a process. Fuller proceeded in a
different direction by a different path.
In the 1950s and 1960s at the Harvard Law School, Fuller's offering
"The Problems of Jurisprudence" was the alternative to Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks's "Legal Process." A few attended Fuller. Most were drawn to
"process." As Holmes had said at the beginning of the century, law was
"like everything else" in the universe, and "[t]he postulate on which we
think about the universe is that there is a fixed quantitative relation
between every phenomenon and its antecedents and consequents.'r.;

2. Fuller's language
Those who attended Fuller's classes in jurisprudence and (perhaps more
importantly) the large numbers who found themselves in his contracts
classes met a style and way of proceeding that was metaphorical, that
used stories and resisted definitions and summaries. It has been observed
before how nonpropositional Fuller was. He did not set out a descriptive
statement, or a definition, or a rule, for debate about "its" meaning or "its"
truth or correctness, or for use as a building block in moving to another

3
4

5

George Steiner, ln Bluebeard's Castle: Some Notes towards the Redefinition of Culture
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale Umversity Press, 1971).
Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964).
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law," Haruard Law Reuiew IO (1897):
457-78, at p. 465.
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statement, definit:ion, rule, whose meaning or truth depended upon having
done with the first, fixed and placed it. Words did not float free in that
way. In law, certainly, they were not detachable from a responsible
decision-maker facing "the rather serious business of interlering in the
lives of others, and the necessity of justifying that interference at every
step."6
Fuller's turning away from the accepted forms of academic discourse proposition isolated and stated first, its establishment as truth, and its
linkage to other propositions by bonds of incontestable logic - did not in
itself surprise law students. The decided case was then the primary
material of legal ,analysis, with legislative language being brought in as
appropriate to the case. The case in law is a story. The case is also the
particular and the concrete, in constant tension with the statistical and
the generalizing and those various and highly developed modes of thought
that cannot admit th e importance of what is only an individual instance.
And the case is a merging of something said and something done, in which
what is done is evidence of the meaning of what is said, and what is said
does not direct what is done before it is done but is said with the doing of
it. This last, this routine merger of doing and saying without losing sight
of either - without indeed being able to lose sight of either - is what
especially pushed Fuller's own interest in "legal fictions," as it had pushed
the lawyer Owen Barfield's interest in metaphor in his seminal Poetic
Diction: A Study in Meaning. 1
In most law schools then as now, reading substantive law preceded
reading about the nature of substantive law and consideration whether it
was "process" or something that could not be wholly captured by "process."
To work day after day on the law of contracts with Fuller and his Basic
Contract Law/'• which was a series of texts essentially without commentary, was to be pulled and tugged until one's mind was able to maintain in
consciousness different considerations, different presences, together r ather like an administrative officer making a decision while seeking in
good faith to remain true to his substantive authorization. To work with
Fuller was to learn that, whatever he might be heard saying about "rules,"
there was no locus for a rule but the responsible reader's and actor's mind,
and that what was affecting us in reading and acting, what was outside
and in the interval between us as individuals, was alive.
6

LF, p. 86.

7

Owen Barfield, Poetic Diction: A Study in Meaning, 2d ed., with a Foreword by Howard
Nemerov (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1984).
Lon L. Fuller, Basic Contract Law (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1947).
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A taste of Fuller's teaching is to be found in Legal Fictions, 9 where he
explores the source of an example of a ''bold fiction," the notion of "attractive nuisance" taught and discussed in tort, and invites his reader to enter
"the mental processes of the judge" working with "trespass" and "invitation" when the case presents a child who has been injured on railroad
property. The judge is pulled back and forth until he is inclined to say:
"For reasons that are essentially inarticulate and not wholly understood
even by myself, I decide for the plaintiff." But Fuller does not allow him to
do that any more than he would a student being trained into the law. He
has his judge speak. The judge is articulate, to make his reasons better
understood by himself as well as by others who must understand them in
some way even to repeat what the judge has said, thinking the repetition
is what the judge has said.
But the words the judge speaks are his own, that were (and are) to be
listened to with an ear like Fuller's, sensitive to the metaphorical nature
of legal language. Turning from teaching substantive law to the question
what it was he was teaching, Fuller uses a story (he self-consciously calls
his use of such stories "similes" 10), indeed a story about a story, to convey
the linguistic quality of a statement of law. Three times in The Law in
Quest of Itself, at the beginning, again in the middle, and in the last
paragraph, he likens it to a retelling. "If the story as I heard it was, in my
opinion, badly told, I am guided largely by my conception of the story as it
ought to be, though through inertia or imperfect insight I shall probably
repeat turns of phrase which have stuck in my memory from the former
telling. On the other hand, if I had the story from a master raconteur, I
may exert myself to reproduce his exact words, though my own conception
of the way the story ought to be told will have to fill in the gaps left by
faulty memory."11 The "growth" of law, Fuller observes (and if there were
fixed points of measurement over time, as there are not, we might also say
"change" in law), "remains as obvious, and as mysterious, as the process
by which an anecdote changes and generally improves in the course of
being retold."12 The judge or legal writer "ought to be proud that his
contribution is such that it cannot be said with certainty whether it is
something new or only the better telling of an old story." 13
And the student who moved from reading statements of law to Fuller's

9

10
11
12
13

LF, pp. 66-68.
LF, pp. 45, 64.
LQI, p. 8.
LQI, p. 114.
LQI, p. 140.
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bound but "unpublished" The Problems of Jurisprudence found those
teaching materials full of stories, for which Fuller became famous and
much loved - the Case of the Speluncean Explorers, eventually published,
the Case of the Grudge Informer, the Case of the Interrupted Whambler,
the Case of the Contract Signed on Book Day, and the Story of Webster
and Pointer. 14 So did the theorist, who came directly to The Problems of
Jurisprudence without having read or made statements oflaw, meet there
the metaphorical quality of legal language in the most engaging way.
Fuller's cases at once impress upon the reader the responsibility of those
speaking in the story for their own conclusions, and the reader's own
responsibility for his or her conclusions. There are no free-floating words
purporting to have a meaning in themselves.

3. The nature of a legal rule
Law is a denial of the standard twentieth-century view of language,
whether in linguistics as it is generally taught (with notable exceptions 15 ),
or in cognitive science, or even in literary discourse that separates "metaphor" to be analyzed apart. The legal form of thought daily practiced is a
continual denial of literalness in meaning and of the reducibility of language to rules. Fuller perceived this, and his willingness to live and
grapple with it was one foundation for his confidence that positivism
tracing law back to an extralegal sovereign, a ''legislator" who ordered as a
master ordered his servant, was a form of academic play and a dangerous
one in its celebration of command and assumption of obedience.
Fuller was led early to see a distinct form of thought in law. 16 He knew
and said that the sovereign was a product of legal thought and recogniza-

Lon L. Fuller, The Problems of Jurisprudence: A Selection o{ Rea.dings Supplemented by
Comments Prepared by the Editor, temp. ed. (Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1949),
though bound and sold was mimeographed rather than printed. In the 1960s it came
with unbound mimeographed "Supplementary Readings." The "cases" were circulated
despite Fuller's various Editor's Notes, "In its present form the book is not intended fo1·
review ... reproduced for private circulation and for use in the author's classes ... not
to be considered as being published for any other purpose."
15 E.g., Roy Harris, Signs, Language, and Communication (London: Routledge, 1996), The
La.ngua.ge Machine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); A.L. Becker, Beyond
Translation: Essays toward a Modern Philology (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1995); Raymond Tallis, The Explicit Animal (London: Macmillan, 1991), Not
Sa.assure (London: Macmillan, 1988).
16 E.g., LF, p. 132.
J4
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ble only through legal method. The observation is familiar enough to
practicing lawyers, who perceive and construct in their everyday work the
legal identity of administrative agencies whose personnel purport to be
speaking on their behalf. No formula guides such recognition, nor the
deference and good faith that follow such recognition. But there is more to
the linguistic aspect than this pulling of the sovereign inside law. The
commands of the sovereign, in positivistic view, were to be in the form of
definitions and categorizations, propositions, with mechanical application
as the ultimate ideal that an underling in a hierarchy might undertake
without thought, and therefore without responsibility - in the same way
he might fill out a form for the transport of Jews to extermination camps.
Fuller saw this in the 1930s, and it energized him. He knew that such
propositions, such "rules," depend upon language. They are not mathematical linkages of empty symbols. And language does not support them or
the edifice they are meant to comprise, whatever may be thought of analysts' discussion, itself in propositional form, of an abstract "duty to obey"
or "prim.a facie" duty, or the absence thereof. "Realists" stood on no firmer
footing. Their "rules" were propositions derived from their reports of the
effect of social, psychological, or biological forces on official behavior, but
still these were utterances that depended upon language.
And though the jurisprudential schools Fuller addressed when he
turned from Legal Fictions to The Law in Quest of Itself are no longer at
the center of academic discussion, his underlying challenge retains its
vitality, that everyone involved in discussion oflaw, and lawyers especially, become aware of language and the implications of views of language.
Fuller would consider current searches for a "theory of law" that would see
law in economic or biological terms equally as a form of academic play.
Their vision also depends upon "rules" that interact with each other and
with individuals' actions as a boundary, fence, or wall, officials' function
being to maintain these boundaries by introducing pain into individuals'
calculations of pleasure and pain, and law as a whole being characterized
as a structure of channels or a mosaic of boundaries inside which individuals make their choices. In the economic theory of law in its fullest form,
the postulated legal structure - often called "the rules of the game" - is
itself a product of economic action, action by individuals behaving no
differently from economic actors generally, in drafting, voting, or deciding.
This is known now as "public-choice theory," and is related in its rather
self-swallowing quality to postmodern views of the ultimacy of process,
historicizing science (and indeed history), and seeing scientists and
science itself (including its vision of evolutionary processes) as temporary
products of evolutionary processes.
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But these rules. these boundaries, these sources of pricks of cost or pain
in utilitarian calculus, are put forth as in law's language. They might in
all-embracing view be considered a subsidiary product of economic "laws."
which might ideally be stated in equational or quasi-mathematical notation. But "the rules" themselves are in language. From time to time the
theorist, economjc or otherwise, disguises this from himself or his discussants by designating what he has in mind as R 1• R.,, or other indicator of a
discrete and graspable unit.17 This is done as much for the purpose of
disguising the troubling composition of what the analys1 has in mind, it
would seem, as for any economy of argument. For whatever their nature,
the rules to which, lawyers refer are not discrete and graspable units. They
arc lawyers' own utterances, put out in justification of their actions and as
additional material from which lawyers in the future will construct their
own utterances.
The rules of the theorist of rules, or of the economist, or the biological
or physical scientist speaking of human law, are of a different order in any
event. They are not uttered ta.king responsibility for their utterance, after
reading legal texts including statutes and hearing and searching out what
is relevant in making a good-faith effort to utter a statement of law. Nor
arc they associated with agonizing action and oft.en violent consequence.
But again, even without that fundamental difference, the rules of the
the01;~t of rules or of the economist or biologist speaking of human law are
propositions that depend upon language, and language itself dissolves the
edifice, the machine, the wall or boundary, back into the human mix from
which it came. There is no authority, legislative, social, or academic,
dictating or controlling the usage of words, controlling even syntax, any
more than (as FuJ1er noted) there is any authority that can dictate change
in the usage of words. 18 Discussants continue to talk as if they had this
rule or Lhat rule, or a set of rules that, if they could only reach so far and
tap it with their fingernail, would give out a metallic sound - they talk in

11

18

Sl•c. e.g., ,Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays 011 /.,au• and Morality !Oxford:
Clarendon Presi:;, 1983), pp. 64-65: "'There is a conclul>ivc n•nson for .t t-0 +or CR. x. t) for
shorl. • A conclusive permission t-0 acl is lhe contradictory of 11 conclusive reason f_Qr
refraining from that act. Hence the following i~ logical truth : ( 24) ~ I R, x. +>- - (Percx ,•).
• . . Statements of the form LRx,6, i.e. there is a legal reason for x to +(which mean the
snme as 'L<>gally x ought t-0 +', 'It is the law lhat .t ought to +'l, arc true, according to the
sourct·~ thesis, because of the existence of ... an appropriate social fact ..."; John
Searle. The Con:;truction of Social Reality (New York: 1''rcc Press, 1995), pp. 46-51 :
"ITlhe formula 'X counts as Yin c· ... gives us a powerful tool." The "Xterm~ and the
"Y term" have "features."
/,P,p. 21 .
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these ways though they have done nothing that would enable them
themselves to utter a rule of law or put them in a position to be listened to
if they did claim they were uttering a rule oflaw. And lawyers cannot help
them because lawyers cannot package what they say, tear it from its
context of responsible action and consequence, and hand it over.
These ways of talking are primarily ways of talking about how the
human being should be viewed - cosmological discussion, if you will,
fitting the human being to the nature of things as the nature of things is
conceived, making the nature of things include the human being. But the
phenomenon, the claim of possession, is itself a rather ordinary and daily
thing, a way of talking each of us can hear and catch ourselves slipping
into. In daily discourse there is something of an automatic correction by
listeners. That has not been so true in academic or theoretical discourse.
Someone - anthropologist, sociobiologist - says: "There are six levels of
empathy," and goes on to order, explain, or refute with references to these
"six levels." But these are his words. The experience that he seeks thus to
grasp is ours, the experience of empathy, what we talk about in various
ways using sometimes the word "empathy." Lawyers are among those who
are trained professionally to remain aware of the personal and linguistic
nature of"six levels of empathy."

4. World views and human law
Fuller was always interested jn autonomous forms of order and the
application of economic insight to the workings of systems. He would not
have been troubled by the ethical concerns, among them poverty and
inequality, that in fact drive much interest in economics today (as he was
troubled, for instance, by the concern with obedience for the sake of order
that he saw driving Holmes's earlier positivism). His eye would have been
drawn to the larger claims made for economics in law, to the transformation of its deliberately limjted view of the human being into positive belief,
its use in promotion and defense of self-aggrandizement by self-isolated
selves. Toward the end of Legal Fictions, he himself treated economics as
based on a "neglective fiction" of great utility, which like other "neglective
fictions" was "highly dangerous" if transferred to a "field in which the
factors neglected by the assumption assume a primary importance."19
In fact the grander claims of this joinder and extension today of the

19

LF, pp. 106-7.
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"realism" and "positivism" which Fuller addressed are associated with
large efforts across a range of fields to pull human affairs finally and
totally into current accounts of material processes. It is to these confident
assertions of what may be called total theory at the end of this century in their confidence and totality so reminiscent of the racial, mechanical,
and economic constructs at the end of the last century - that Fuller speaks
directly from the experience of the 1930s and 1940s, and it is here that
Fuller's linguistic legacy and challenge are most important.
A representative example of theorizing of a total kind, one of many that
could be chosen from many disciplines, is the contemporary work of the
well-known and djstinguished American philosopher John Searle. In The
Rediscovery of the Mind, 20 Searle speaks of "what sort of place the universe is and how it works" and a world view that is "so well established as
to be no longer optional for reasonably well-educated citizens of the
present era."21 "Basic to our world view is the idea that human beings and
other higher animals are part of the biological order like any other organisms .... [T]he biologically specific characteristics of these animals - ...
their capacity for language . . . their capacity for rational thought, etc. are biological phenomena like any other biological phenomena ... [L]ike it
or not, it is the world view we have. Given what we know about the details
of the world ... this world view is not an option."22
To others' views or doubts that challenge the total reach of his world
view, Searle acknowledges his "insensitivity." They are "in the grip of
faith" or "have not heard the news" and "in our deepest reflections we
cannot take such opinions seriously." After lecturing to educated Hindus
in India, his conclusion was, "Given what I know about how the world
works I could not regard their views as serious candidates for truth."'l3
In The Construction of Social Reality,24 Searle takes up law. "Our aim is
to assimilate social reality to our basic ontology of physics, chemistry, and
biology .... The world of Supreme Court decisions ... is the same world as
the world of the formation of planets and of the collapse of the wave
function in quantum mechanics."25 "Culture," he concludes, "is the form
that biology takes. There could not be an opposition between culture and

John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MJT Press, 1992).
Searle, Rediscovery of the Mind, pp. 85-86.
Searle, Rediscovery of the Mind, pp. 89-90.
Searle, Rediscovery o( the Mind, p. 91.
24 John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995).
25 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, pp. 41, 120.

20
21
22
23
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biology, because if there were, biology would always win."26 And so he
asks, "How can there be an objective world of money, property, marriage,
governments, elections, football games, cocktail parties and law courts in
a world that consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force, and in
which some of these particles are organized into systems that are conscious biological beasts, such as ourselves?"27
His answer is that there are "constitutive rules" that "come in systems"
in a "structure of hierarchies," which define activities, and "regulative
rules" which regulate them, such as "the criminal law," and these "rules of
the game" are the building blocks of social reality and institutional
power. 28
Searle is misinformed about law, as are many like him. Rediscovering
Fuller would have been of help to Searle. It will help others from being
misinformed. Work like Searle's toward a total theory is widely taught,
and students are tested on it. Attending to Fuller might in its own way be
helpfully economic and efficient, with less waste of the time of youth set to
read and learn what they only have to unlearn in life.
Of course, we do speak of legal rules and argue in the language of rules.
It is useful to do so, an important part of mutual persuasion, a way of
offering not just a vague suggestion but a finished product for serious
consideration. "Suppose we all said this," says a lawyer, or a scholar, or a
judge to a judge on a multimember court, or a multimember court to the
legal world at large. "This" is put, said, in the form of a iule. Fuller speaks
of "the rule" even as he observes that "at any given point it is difficult to
say whether the court is announcing a new rule or only making explicit
assumptions which lay implicit in the old rule."29
But practicing lawyers and working judges know in their bones that
while texts can be closely read, including texts setting out "a rule," "the
rule" cannot. Fuller does not let us lose sight of the active reader and
decision-maker. Speaking of absolute presumptions in law as "fictions" if
they are presented "as 'directing an inference' or as commanding an 'act of
reasoning,"' he notes: "If I am merely accepting someone else's ready-made
inference, I am not 'inferring."'30 The unembodiedness of "the rule" - the
unembodiedness that is necessarily associated with continuous and
responsible decision-making by many and that makes possible deference
Searle, Construction of Social Reality, p. 227.
Searle, Construction of Social Reality, p. xi-xii.
28 Searle, Construction of Social Reality, e.g. pp. 27-29, 50-51, 54-56, 103, 228.
29 LQI, p. 133.
30 LF, p. 44.
26

27
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by many to decisions made - is brought out and underscored when there is
criminal prosecution for noncompliance with the law, for "violating" the
law (a common image, read as violating a person, a trust, a sacred place,
rather than "violating a rule"). Condemnation of a person for an event in
the world, without associating the person as a person with the event,
raises a constitutional question, in both the United States and in civil-law
jurisdictions in Europe. There is inquiry into the "mind of the accused,"
mens rea. In determining whether there is the "element" of mens rea in
the case, the question is how far the accused's "ignorance of the law" is to
be ignored in condemnation, and how much instead it prevents true
condemnation. "Ignorance of the law is no defense," it is said. What is the
ignorance of, that is ignored by the law? It may be only the words of some
particular text. What ''knowledge" of the law is required, by interpretation
of a requirement of mens rea, or constitutionally? What is the knowledge
of, which, if found in the evidence, meets the mens rea requirement? It
need not be the words of any particular text. It is rather knowledge of
living value, purpose, mind, intent.
Again, the importance of this is not clarity in descriptive thought, the
satisfaction of having gotten it right. The great consequence, the issue of
fundamental importance, is the vision of the human being held and acted
upon. This touches what Fuller shyly called the "cosmic" in his 1967
introduction to Legal Fictions, 31 what Holmes called "the universe" to
which the "subject of law" was to be "connected,"32 Searle's "what sort of
place the universe is and how it works," "our world view," "what we know
about the details of the world," "what I know about how the world works."
The view of human beings as things, the ingredients of systems, fungible
units, is the crossing point of total theory of a cosmological kind, and the
earth-bound totalitarian in social and political thought and action to
which Fuller was responding in the 1930s and 1940s. In each, the person
is absent. The American Bar Association Journaz 3:3 recently highlighted a
symposium of experts brought together to discuss "a pair of questions: Is
human behavior and more specifically, criminal behavior, the result of
social factors, biological factors or a combination of the two? And if it's the
latter what combination of factors makes up the mix, and in what proportion?" The answer, the journal reported, was that "What we do know is

3J LF, p. xii.
32 Holmes, "Path of the Law," at p. 478.
33 American Bar Association Journal (July 1997), at pp. 20-21.
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that human behavior appears to be governed by a complicated and ever
changing mix of biological and environmental factors ..."
There is no third participant in this government. The person is missing
from the analysis. The person may be assumed or implied, for there are
references to "we" elsewhere in the report. But where this absence is made
explicit in theoretical analysis that is meant to be exclusive, a world view
is proffered, and in that world view including all, there is an invitation to
see law as system and those in law as systems, rather in the way administrators working in harsh and desperate conditions see offenders whom
they deem sociopathic - which is the same way the sociopath is seen to
view his victims - as subjects for manipulation and intervention, systems
all, the manipulation of which is itself part of the workings of a system.
There is no place for cruelty in this world view, just as there is no place for
metaphor in it, or for authority. The question of cruelty, like the question
of respect, does not arise, cannot enter the mind, when what is seen is
ultimately only a system. There is no one speaking and no one listening only "governance" by forces operating.
But the support of law for this world view dissolves, for this as a view
including all and for this as a view of human beings. That the presuppositions, practices, and beliefs of a sect or tribe are inconsistent with a world
view might be of no concern to those who present it. But the phenomenon
of law is not so dismissable. It is too pervasive, and it is what makes the
very expression of world views possible.

5. The nature of reading in law
The dissolution of law's support, its denial of the cosmic picture of ultimate reality as a system of systems, begins at the point of reading itself, and
spreads out from it.
Reading a paragraph of a legal text, or reading the text as a whole, or
reading the law of a subject-matter area, is not a matter of finding a
proposition, moving to some derivation from it, and then examining the
validity of the logical path between them. Reading is like a light ranging
over a text, picking up this, picking out that, moving up and down, back
and forth - like looking at a face speaking, like reading a letter. The
constant question is, What is meant? There is no assumption that what
the light ranging over the text or mass of texts picks out here or there is
wh at is meant, even if it is in declaratory or summary form.
Nor is there any assumption that what is repeated takes one closer to
the meaning (unlike programs designed to shorten and summarize a
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written text by counting the number of times a word, phrase, or sentence
appears in the text and weighting it accordingly). Repetition may. Then
again it may not, as in the case of a person caught in meaningless repetition, endlessly washing hands, repeating a word over and over. In speaking, the experience is common enough that much repetition of a word or
phrase drains it of all meaning and leaves it a sound strange to the ear in
which it was once familiar.
The reading of a legal text is like the reading of a person, not like the
reading of a logical demonstration. It is not, as in applied mathematics or
experimentation, a test of the usefulness of a summary definition, any
more than readjng a person is a test of a summary definition. A summary
is another text the reader may produce after reading. Then that summary,
and all that surrounds it, will have a light ranging over it when another
picks it up to read.
But again, lawyers speak as if human law were a set of rules, knowing
that law can never be a set of rules that a computer scientist, a cook, or a
chess player might recognize as such, and that there is no one who can
take you by the hand and say: "Come, I will show it to you." It is one of the
useful fictions of lawyers as Fuller might say, one they perhaps cannot
help because simple and brief alternatives are not at hand, if a fiction
uttered knowing it is a fiction and without concealment is still a fiction.
Or, as Fuller might also say, like any other statement it is to be read in its
context. In view of this it may be useful, for lawyers as well as nonlawyers, to take up two different contexts where the nature of a lawyer's rule
can be seen, contexts that will not lead us far from Fuller's own use of the
phenomenon he called "fiction" as a lens to look at legal language, and
through language at law. Guido Calabresi's exploration of the uses of
judicial "subterfuge" will serve as an example in the particular, and the
claim and acceptance of the claim that there can be "evasion of the law" by
citizens that violates the law will serve as an example of a more general
kind.

5.1. The example of "subterfuge"
In his A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, 34 Calabresi argues in favor
of courts' treating legislative materials much like common-law materials.
Grant Gilmore before him had argued that courts should do so and actual-

34 Guido Calabresi, A Common

University Press, 1982).

Law for the Age of Statutes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

466

Joseph Vining

ly did so in practice, in The Ages of American Law. 35 What is suggested is
that courts give some statutes less weight than others against the background of a coherent whole, press the legislature to reconsider the subject
matter of a statute, and otherwise react to the growing bulk of statutory
material and to the wide variation in statutes' connection to any deliberative or democratic process.36 The suggestion is not inconsistent with
Fuller's reservations about the place of statutory material in legal reasoning.
To explore a difference between courts' using "subterfuge" in handling
legislative "command" in this way, and being "explicit" or "candid" about
doing so, Calabresi must set up such a difference, and he presents for that
purpose one of the hardest cases to think about in law, the sanctioning of
torture. 37 He uses Charles Black's example, an "absolute prohibition"
against torture (that is, Black's absolute prohibition) and a hypothetical
case in which a judge is faced on the one hand with a claim on behalf of a
prisoner that he is being tortured and, on the other, with a demonstration
by the police "beyond a doubt" that the prisoner has hidden a hydrogen
bomb in a major city, set to explode in one hour, and that the only thing
the prisoner fears is hideous pain. No one, it is suggested, would enforce

the supposed absolute rule against torture and let the city be destroyed.
Rather than this, anyone and everyone would find some way to avoid it,
would manipulate procedure, adjourn the court for a time, would possibly
even resign. The question then is whether there is a "rule against torture"
which is an "absolute" rule.
Calabresi's discussion of the matter contrasts a rule in which there is a
balancing of the need for torture against its harm, and he concludes that
an "absolute" rule has in practice the more desired result, which is the
elimination of torture as much as possible. This is taken to be one example
and justification of "subterfuge" or "fiction" in legal language and practice,
as opposed to "candor" in the use of language. What the example together
with the discussion of it underlines is how easy it is to assume there is a
choice between a "literal" use of words in law, and some other use. Of
course there is a choice between inauthenticity and authenticity (if it is

Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1977).
36 Cf. my own The Authoritative and the Authoritarian (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, [1986] 1988), chapters 9 and 10, and note Joseph Sax's perception of a judicial
"remand to the legislature" in environmental law, in Defending the Environment: A
Handbook for Citizen Action (New York: Vintage Books, 1972).
37 Calabresi, A Common Law, pp. 172-77.
35
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within our capacities to work hard enough to be truly inauthentic): there
is truth and falsehood within the person - falsehood in nonbelief, hypocrisy, manipulation, inauthenticity; absence of truth in making an utterance
"without meaning it"; strange truth that surprises in irony, jokes, and
laughter. But there is no truth or falsehood with regard to what meaning
might be attached to words' straight and curving lines and dots. There is a
usual use. There is no profit in being perverse. People crave to be understood. The usual use may possibly be apprehended statistically, except
that the statistical categories would have to be couched in words. But
"absolute" has no meaning apart from the speaker of it when it is spoken
and apart from its concrete use.
One might well not have anything to do with torture at all - with doing
it, ordering it, permitting it. One might feel obliged to intervene to stop it,
and put the fate of the city in the hands of providence if one believed in
providence. But if, under someone's "absolute rule against torture" ("under" being a very figurative word when we use it thus), torture is permitted in some cases, then the rule is not "absolute" in the sense in which the
term absolute might be used in other situations or outside law. What
would be read before making a responsible decision would be the justifications of other responsible decisions in which sentences in the form of rules
like this one could be found, the reading of such other decisions including
both what was done and what was said about what was done.
"Speech, like torture, does have a meaning," Calabresi goes on to say,
"and it would not be forthright to say that Charles Black's absolutist can
get out of the dilemma, honestly, by interpreting the excruciating pain
inflicted on the hypothetical prisoner as not being torture."38 Again, this
nice example is revealing at more than one level. "Charles Black's absolutist" has concluded for himself what absolute is to mean. The "rule" is an
utterance of an academic lawyer. Calabresi's own comment is certainly
understandable, particularly with its references to "forthrightness" and
"honesty" that point where meaning lies. Words can be given meanings
within one's own mind and deliberately played off against one another,
and they can be seen by others to be playing off against each other within
the intent of the speaker. In Cockney rhyming slang, loaf means head
because "loaf of bread" rhymes with ''head." "Loaf' would not give pleasure
unless bread, for the speaker, did not mean head. And the pleasure
extends to us who, without thinking very hard, do not usually use bread

38
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(or loaf) where we usually use head. 39 We are constantly trying to tie down
words, and we do so partly by looking at them through the eyes of others.
But no word "has" a meaning. The question in law and in much of life is
what to do and how to think, and how to express to others what is done
and how it was considered. Language is in service of this, and does not
itself "govern." It cannot. It is only sounds and marks - unless we are
willing to enter realms of possibility that rather few in the West would
find comfortable.
If one would not want, for all the reasons one would not want it, to say
that excruciating pain was not torture (and the very great difficulties in
"defining'' genocide in the international convention against genocide
should give anyone pause before "torture" is assumed to have an utterly
definable content from which no one but the mad or the irrational could
dissent), still there are no grounds for asserting that "absolute" does not
have the practical meaning that emerges from its use. Emerging here,
"absolute" would be taken to mean "never, never, never unless you absolutely have to" and "think, think, think before you do approve torture."
There are in fact a number of other contexts in law in which something of
the same thing is said, or attempted to be said, as in British and American
administrative law, where reviewing courts are admonished with a limited
repertoire of statutory or common-law statements of "standards of review"
expanding or contracting their jurisdiction - the degree of their inquiry
and action - and always there is a question what is meant for each case by
the words used.
You never know, as a responsible decision-maker, what the rule of law
is until the decision is made. In the text that accompanies the decision,
the justification is then called and sometimes linguistically cast in the
form of a rule for presentation to the future, and it takes its place along
with all the other "rules" in other texts that might be brought to bear on a
situation. This is a source of the excitement when young and first entering
into legal language, not unlike the excitement of the discovery of poetic
diction. Legal language is different from mathematics, which is deliberately tautological so that it can be precise, empty so that it can be precise,
empty so that it can be said that "1" can never, never, never be "2." And

to rhyming slang in 1961 as a student when I worked in a Borstal
institution (see Brendan Behan, Borstal Boy, London: Corgi Books, 1961), and the
house newspaper referred to me as China Joe. "China" is "china plate," which rhymes
with "mate." Part of the fascination of rhyming slang is the ordinariness of its context.
So many are doing it that the whiff of rare talent is not in the air, which makes
language itself all the more an object of amazement.
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legal language is different from literary language, though like literary
language it is expressive. Legal language is different from both the mathematical and the literary because of its connection with action. Consequences in the world ride on the statements made. Orders are given that
are enforced at the point of a gun. Decision-makers must sleep at night
after terrible harm has been done to another human being by reason of
their own statements.

5.2 The example of "evasion"
From the illustration of this case that no one would want to have to
decide, and Ca,labresi's illustrative discussion of it, we may turn to the
equally revealing and more general phenomenon of evasion of law that is
recognized as violation of law, a distinctive feature of the law of corporations and of substantive fields of law new since Fuller's early work environmental, drug, or worker safety - where there is an administrative
agency in action. Even outside criminal law (which is often also made
applicable in these fields) there is no mere price put on private choices, as
in the old Holmesean view of contract remedies and some modern views of
tort remedies. The terms of discussion are violation and law-abidingness,
compliance and noncompliance, with sanctions and remedies that may
include injunctions and guardianships that reverse transactions, unravel
arrangements, and replace decision-making individuals in private organizations. Evasion is recognized as violation both as a matter of common law
and in explicit regulatory and statutory language.
When there is expression of the rule violated, it goes beyond the words
of any particular formulation. You do not use the word "evasion" without
moving beyond the words of any particular text you may be pointing to
when you say there has been "evasion" of the law. You are not saying that
the words themselves prohibit or require what is presented to you for your
judgment. That you cannot say so is one reason why you are moved to see
or claim an "evasion" rather than a "direct violation." (The person active in
the field, to whom the law speaks as much as to an administrator or
prosecutor especially interested in the field, is also thought to be able to
see what is "evasion": the question of surprise rapidly becomes the question how much the expressed surprise is feigned.)
You must add words, build on the words which are there, before you
can reach a "prohibition" that matches what a clever person has done (or,
if you are the clever person, what you are thinking about doing) or a
requirement that is not fulfilled by what she has done (or you are thinking
about doing). To add to those words, build on what is there in the text you
have in hand, you must look to the mind, to what is sometimes called
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"intent," to purpose. If there is no mind to move to, no intent, no purpose,
then there are no words to add. And there is no evasion, no violation of
law, no noncompliance with the rule (if the language of rules is still to be
used), no failure in law-abidingness.
But it seems to be a curious, almost technical fact about the working of
language, that if more words are added - not by you thinking, but by the
prior drafter of a particular text - and more words, and more words, so
that a "direct" violation of a "rule" can be claimed pointing to the words of
that particular text, the opportunities for manipulation increase as fast or
faster than words can be added. "Loopholes" arise for the clever, the
determined, the well-advised, "gaps" open up that can be slipped through
as if Wall's fingers inA Midsummer Night's Dream kept opening to supply
new chinks. And to say that "slipping through" and "finding a way around"
is noncompliance, one must return to pointing beyond the words, and face
the consequences of being unable to point beyond the words if one should
take the position that there is not in the case presented (or there is never)
anything to point to.
And on the other hand, if there is a mind behind the words of the text,
and a purpose, and intent, it might be an adversarial mind and a hostile
intent, the mind attributed to the pathological manipulator, or the profitmaximizing corporation, or the tyrannous organ of government, all of
whom may purport to lay down "rules" to be followed. Then that mind and
intent and purpose cannot be internalized by the decision-maker facing
the words of the text. Such an internalization eliminates the person twentieth-century literature explores the void that would be there.
Then there can be no claim that the actor, the decision-maker in the
field who is not an administrator or a prosecutor, should have added to
the words in his own mind. There is no noncompliance, no evasion, just a
game of sorts, each side playing with words as far as words can go, if
"play" or a "game" can be seen at all: certainly, the fingering of words then
is unlike the poet's wordplay, which is a show of caring for the listener he
is trying to provoke or delight. The lawyer, responsible for saying what the
law is and whether there is compliance, cannot look merely to parrot
words, for when evasion is in question the words are not there. The lawyer
- it is an aspect of priestly character - must look to see whether there is
mind, and then caring mind, before he or she can say there is law with
which there has been noncompliance and that there is an actor and
decision-maker who is not being law-abiding.
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6. Rules of law and rules of games
So often, in pushing toward a sense of law, the question is heard whether
seeing a game in it should not be enough for practical purposes. The
difference is emphasized between satisfaction with something described in
rough detail and an academic thirst for a thorough understanding, and the
proposition that statements of law are rules of a game is offered as a
pragmatic truth.
For all the many functions of games, and the intrinsic pleasure in them
akin to the pleasure of dance, there is a little hole of emptiness at the
center of game~. The point of a game is playing, or the point of playing is
the game itself. Games are play, they are not real, what happens does not
really matter. But (for that very reason) life is not a game, and law which
is part of life is not a game. What is said and done does matter and (for
that very reason also) the "rules" of law, or the various texts that are
variously pointed to and called rules, are not like the rules of a game. If
you want to play the game of football you do this. As the economist Frank
Knight observed, you do not win in getting the ball over the goal line if all
twenty-two men have been put on the same side. You have not played the
game of football. Games are understandably intertwined with rules,
unless ''breaking the rules and getting away with it" is part of the game,
in which case the game escapes into an attitude. Playing, if that is the
point of the game and the game itself is not the point, is intertwined with
rules: pretending, as on a stage, requires a script to follow, just as imitation requires something to imitate. Nor are rules of law like rules of mundane cooking. If you wish to make a cake, you do this; if you do not do this,
you do not make a cake. Nor are they like rules of ordinary calculation. If
you would divide 4 by 2, you do this. If you do not do this, you have not
divided 4 by 2.
Law is not pretending. It is not imitating. Law is for real. And the
decision-maker facing law is not in a situation of if-then. If-then rules
come into consideration only if one wants to proceed. There is an element
of voluntary invocation, in cooking, or a game, that is not part of facing the
law. In life you must go on, you must proceed, into the new where imitation, repetition, is not enough. And there are the questions of law when
you do, with you and against you and around you. Moreover, in life your
object is not fixed; it changes as you proceed. You must go forward but it is
not or is no longer a cake you wish to make. And there is law, still with
you as you grope your way along.
Generalizations about law based upon the actualities of its practice and
method leave the person at the center of thought. Where differences
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between the real and the less-real or the not-real are being contemplated,
observation of law is a "rediscovery" of the reality of the person, the person
individual and the person behind and beyond the individual, rediscovery if
forms of thought that have no place for the person have occupied the
mind. Observation of legal language at work leads further - for law,
though a field with special practitioners, is not separate from ordinary life
- to the fundamental fact that there is no literal meaning in human
language, that meaning is not there without the person there. Since total
and closed systems offered as a picture of the world are in language and
contemplate interrelated parts made of language, the observation of legal
language can lead to the largest practical consequence for human affairs,
the one that would be closest to Fuller's ultimate concern, a dissolution of
any invitation to ignore what identifies as human the actor and the actedupon.

7. Reading Fuller as an exercise
Legal Fictions itself is something of a demonstration of the delicacy of the
self-awareness toward which Fuller points, an exercise any of us might
put ourselves through as we talk in a propositional way all the while
assuming people will read us as a whole and try to understand what we
are saying - read us, as it were, metaphorically.
The first sentence of the book speaks of judges and writers on law
making "statements they know to be false," immediately setting up a
contrast between a true and a false use of words. But by page 5 he has
come to ask what a "fiction" is, since "the word 'fiction,' like most words,
may not always mean the same thing." On page 8 he speaks of the hope
that a "defect" in our expression "could be shown not to affect the validity
of the statement in its context. We trust that our statement is at least
metaphorically true" - setting up a distinction between the metaphorical
and the literal. And from "defect," he moves to:"... the fiction is 'a disease
or affection of language."'40 But the "literal connotations" of breaking a
contract or the ripening of an obligation are "inappropriate,''41 and "change
takes place in the meaning of the words or phrases involved," "a process
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that is going on all the time," and "this process is not confined to the law it takes place in the whole of our language."42
Where does this change take place? Fuller does not say - the implication of a "true" meaning limits his own expression - but, after acknowledging that there is no fiat with respect to usage, 43 he indicates where
change takes place by turning to the "motive" of the author, to an understanding of "what actuated" the users of "fictions" if "we are to understand
what is meant by their fictions."44 Moreover, "eliminate metaphor from the
law" - the implication being that the elimination of metaphor is possible "and you have reduced its power to convince and convert."45 Fuller begins
to move quietly to conviction - responsible belief by an active decisionmaker - and to authenticity within the person, as gauge of truth or
falsehood in the use of words. The strike against the "conclusive presumption," what makes a statement containing this "fiction" false, is that it
"attributes to the facts 'an artificial effect beyond their natural tendency
to produce belief."'46 By page 94, where he begins his exposition of the latenineteenth-century work of Hans Vaihinger, Fuller is observing that, with
fictions, "we are in contact with a fundamental trait of human reason. To
understand the function of the legal fiction we must undertake an examination of the processes of human thought generally."
There he enters what he later was to call the "cosmic," abashedly and
so differently from Holmes, who was not at all bashful about doing so. He
notes that "metaphorical contamination is at a minimum in mathematical
symbols" and also that mathematical symbols have a "colorless quality." 47
"Tau tological and fictitious" is the "notion of the Thing and its Properties,
fundamental as it is for thought," 48 and he notes what the legally trained
can see perhaps most easily, that the tendency in scientific and philosophical discourse to speak of "properties" is a transference, back from
law, of the world of "ownership,"49 as is indeed the mental picture of "the
'laws' of nature . .. 'ruling the universe"' a transference back from law,
when the laws of nature are instead- Fuller quotes Ernst Mach- "limitations which, under the guidance of experience, we impose on our expecta-

LF, pp. 14-15.
LF, p. 21.
LF, pp. 49-50.
LF, p. 24.
46 LF, p. 42.
47 LF, p. 116.
48 LF, p. 101.
49 LF, p. 114.
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tions." 50 We might add today what Fuller especially could be heard adding,
that the transferred use of "property" leaves behind, forgets or must
forget, that in the world of "ownership" each exclusion, each taking, each
holding on, each order enforced on the basis of a claim to exclude or take
or hold is, if challenged, a consequence of a responsible decision after
argument.
At the end, Fuller faces the question of truth and falsehood directly:
"We say we reach 'righ t' results by proceeding upon 'false' ideas. But why
do we believe these ideas to be 'false'? ... Is it not clear, on reflection, that
we have been determining 'truth' or 'falsity' by the inquiry: Has the idea in
question a counterpart in the world of reality external to us?" This is "an
erroneous theory of truth, a theory that we may call 'the picture theory of
truth."'51 From law and legal thought he reintroduces purpose as inextricably woven into any human statement of truth and any human action.
While maintaining that "law was the first of the sciences" if "we define
science as the conscious generalization of experience,"52 he has arrived,
through his effort to grapple with the nature of language, at the position
that there can be no categorical distinction between the "is" and the
"ough t" in human affairs, wh ich he pursued in The Law in Quest of Itself a
decade later and was to maintain throughout his later work. It is not
surprising that, given the connection between truth and person and the
necessity of reading the whole to read for meaning, Fuller should decline
to engage in propositional discourse in his conclusion: "It might be expected that in closing our discussion of the legal fiction we should attempt a
summary of th e views that have been developed in the course of this
rather lengthy study. But the reader who has followed the discussion thus
far will perhaps be willing to forgive the omission of such a summary. The
matter is not simple enough to permit reduction to a compact formula."53
F uller observes of Vaihinger's The Philosophy of As If, which he uses to
organize his final observations in Legal Fictions, that "there runs through
the whole book a curious double language. He speaks of the 'illusion of
knowledge' produced by the fiction and at the same time recognizes that
this knowledge is real in the sense that it enables us to deal with reality
and is in fact the only knowledge we ever knew or can know."54 The same
might be said of Fuller. In his 1967 Introduction to the reissue of Legal
50 LF, p. 116.
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Fictions he does not enter into the reduction to propositions he refused
thirty-seven years before. His treatment is much the same: "The fiction,"
he says, "represents the pathology of the law," or, "changing the figure," it
is "an awkward patch." But then he refers to the "problem the fiction is
intended to solve," which is "bridging a gap" between "understanding and
the thing sought to be understood." The last sentence of his Introduction
asks "of the reader that he regard as allegorical anything he encounters in
this book (including The Philosophy of As If) that seems to him to bear too
plainly the marks of its age."
8. Objectivity and individuality in language
The observation of "double language" might be made about any of us. I
myself say, here, "No word 'has' a meaning." I put "has" in quotation
marks to point to its real meaning and its special use in a sentence by
Calabresi, who moves (and in the very same sentence) to authenticity,
"honesty," as the measure of meaning- as did Fuller.
I put quotation marks around Calabresi's possessory verb in his sentence. But this is my writing which you will read. The word's "real meaning'' is its meaning for me, which I hope you will understand and which I
think is also likely to be its meaning for you in your usage. I say "Fuller
changes" as you move through his book, or that he necessarily "must be
read as a whole," or that theorists like Searle "are misinformed." To do
this at all, I fix words in my own utterance. But that is not my object, any
more than it was Fuller's object in discussing what he called "fictions" to
fix the meaning of words, even the word "fiction." I am seeking to be
understood. I fix the meaning of words well or badly when I speak, with an
eye to others' view of what I say as a whole; and I am open to the same
question, from a reader, that I ask when I read or that Fuller can be seen
to be asking when he reads, ''What does this word really mean for him,
even when he is quoting the word from another?" You scour deliberately or
unconsciously what I say for inconsistencies, which you do to understand
the whole. Something must be fixed for this. You assume meanings when
you see inconsistency, even when you reconcile inconsistency by dropping
out what you conclude is not meant. But it must be remembered that it is
you and I who are doing this, that, again, our object is to understand, not
to fix. At the very moment we understand, we each will speak again, and
present a whole again, which will be examined again - by others and by
ourselves who speak - through its parts, which are then fixed for the
purpose.
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With that object, perversity is self-defeating. Idiosyncracy perhaps
refreshes and maintains attention and thus contributes as such. But in
general, we try to look at what we say through others' eyes if we want to
be understood. Fuller himself perhaps began Legal Fictions implying a
distinction between the literal and the nonliteral, true use and false use,
not just to steady himself, and not just because he did not wish to lose an
audience for whom usual usage and special usage had become the ''literal"
or "true" on the one hand and the "metaphorical" or "false" on the other.
There is comfort any of us can feel in averting the eyes from responsibility
for the meaning of words and in supposing that words, those straight and
curving lines and dots, had meanings attached like feathers to a bird,
which could gradually strangely change over time. And in fact, in our
experience there is stability in language. But its stability, what might be
called its "objectivity" if that did not obscure too much the person speaking, largely flows from our looking at our words, our phrases and our
constructions, through others' eyes. Will "'Twas brillig, and the slithy
toves" delight our particular listener and be understood in its own way?
Then we will say it, though the words are new-minted.55
As I write, the Martian Rover has rolled down its ramp into the red
dust of Mars, and the mission manager has said: "All the scientists are in
heaven." I think, "What can he mean by that?" And then I think, "Perhaps
they are in heaven, a little bit." The notions of the true and the fictional,
the literal and the metaphorical, play back and forth. But they play back
and forth in my mind, and in the mission manager's. The two of us could
argue what was literal and what was metaphorical, what was real, and
what imaginary, but there would be no arbiter to declare a winner. How
we talk affects each of us and what we each of us pass on and teach to the
law we work largely with written texts. In spoken language, words are in a context
that goes beyond other words. But even written language conveys a voice and has color,
echoes, cadence, and other indications of authenticity that may possibly not depend
upon fixing the meanings of words for determinations of inconsistency or deciding
re lative degrees of "not meaning it." Explicit attention in discussions of the nature of
human language to these aspects (of both the spoken and the written) opens questions including the question what is a "word" - that are raised in neurologists' discussions of
recognition of truth or falsity in spoken language by global aphasiacs who have lost the
capacity to understand words as such. The intelligent aphasiac - the person within
whom is not in doubt - is reported to understand so much of what is said that extraordinarily delicate tests are necessary to demonstrate aphasia. The phenomenon is a
fascinating reminder of how easy it is, when language is the subject, to come too soon to
final conclusions about it. See Henry Head, Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926) and Oliver Sacks, The Man Who
Mistook His Wife for a Hat (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), pp. 80-82 (citing Head).
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users of language coming after us. If we stay talking to one another there
will be an observable generality of usage. But generality of usage is just
generality of usage, a statistical figure or a figurative statistic, a number
if a number could be obtained, itself without meaning. Value may live
between us and without us, like the world: what we speak about may have
meaning. But unless language draws on the Sanskrit of the Gods or the
Kabbalistic Hebrew - and of course it may, and itself speak to us: language's music, like the beauty of Nature, is still a mystery - the words we
use, even the syntactical forms we use, take their meaning from the
person in us.

9. The connection between the linguistic and the ethical
But we would not be true to Fuller's legacy if we did not revisit and
reemphasize the connection between a larger sense of things - a sense of
the nature of what is and the way the world works - and what we
ourselves do and what our contribution is to the way the world will be.
Arguments over the nature of human language cannot be separated from
political, moral, or ethical questions, and conclusions about the nature of
human language are pertinent to human action. To see the individual as
other than a source of the meaning of language (in the use of language by
all) is to see him as subject to rules (I will not call them laws) which he
must obey. He must obey in the strictest and most authoritarian sense,
except that if he does not obey, he is then not merely defiant, and a
challenge to the rule, but defective, and subject to elimination or correction to the point where he is no longer defective. Language is the crossing
point of the total reign of system in cosmological view - our sense of the
very nature of things including ourselves - and the totalitarian in social
and political thought and action.
The connection can be evoked most succinctly in the negative, awkward
and inadequate as statements in the negative are. Only if there is ultimately no literal meaning can democracy even be thought of, or the trusteeship that is alternative and supplement to democracy be contemplated,
including trusteeship for those to be born in the future who do not yet
have a voice. Only if there is ultimately nothing but the heart of the
speaker as gauge of the meaning of a statement, nothing but the heart of
the individual and the person, can democratic aspirations or responsible
government even be approached. Only if the meaning of human language
rests in the person's purpose and use, only if the nature of human language is that it is not ultimately a system of units "governed" by rules like
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any other system and not a "property" of a system of units governed by
rules, neither a system innate nor a system emerging that forms at ''birth"
and develops in an environmental "culture" and dissolves at "death," will
constraints on force be real.
Or, less negatively, only if the linguistic proposition that language is a
system among systems remains a plaything of thought, or something like
a piton in mountain climbing that the human hand removes when its
usefulness is past - remains a plaything or crutch of thought and is not
believed - can there be any genuine respect for individuals, openness to
them, valuing of their life, silence at their death, limitation on the use of
them, and protection of each of them as each a source of meaning.
Politics and ethics, and what we say (afterwards) is atrocity, are never
far from the steps we take toward or away from a cosmology. Denial of the
individual and the person as each a source of meaning, denial for reasons
having to do with a sense of the nature of things, steps us into those total
social and political views - racial, economic, sociological - of which we
have had such experience this century. Denial of that denial, despite the
perhaps surprising implication for what is actually believed about the
nature of things, steps out of and away from the totalitarian in thought,
and back from the totalitarian in action.

